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Under the assumption of information asymmetry between market investors and
ﬁrm managers, a reduced form model of a ﬁrm is developed in order to derive
optimal investment strategies and capital structures while taking into account
the eﬀects of dividend policies and taxes. The motivation of the reduced form
approach lies in its empirical implementation tractability. Closed-form solu-
tions for debt issuance prices and debt values from ﬁrm managers’ perspective
are derived. Considering the inconsistency between the two prices incurred
from the asymmetric information, a ﬁrm’s problem of optimal investment risk
determination is presented and solved by trading oﬀ two opposing eﬀects: asset
substitution and default cost. Furthermore, the optimal dividend policy and tax
beneﬁts from debt interest payment are also considered, and the application of
the model in portfolio management is discussed. Finally, two simple examples
are provided. Under these two speciﬁc settings, the optimal investment policies
are derived explicitly to illustrate the implementation of the model proposed in
this paper and demonstrate the general consistency of the results implied by
our methodology and the traditional structural framework.1 Introduction
Firm managers are continually faced with choices among various options for
their ﬁrms’ future investments. Their investment decisions depend not only on
the initial capital requirements and risk exposure of these diﬀerent investment
options, but also on their ﬁrm’s current budget and costs of debt issuance. Fur-
thermore, their decisions will often inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s future asset returns and
the potential default or bankruptcy risk. Due to the limited capital available,
in order to undertake investment projects, a ﬁrm typically needs to raise funds
from external sources of ﬁnance. Two general solutions are usually considered:
raising additional equity capital, and debt ﬁnancing. In this paper, we focus
on the impact of corporate debt ﬁnancing on investment decisions, and thus we
assume initially that the issuance of additional equity is too costly to pursue
in view of the agency costs and market imperfections. This assumption can be
relaxed, as we will discuss in the sequel, by changing the initial constraint on
capital budgets.
In order to derive optimal investment strategies and corporate ﬁnancing
policies, we develop here a continuous-time reduced form model of the ﬁrm.
We model a ﬁrm’s asset return as a general geometric Brownian motion with
stochastic volatility, whose growth rate and volatility are determined by ﬁrm
managers through their investment decisions, as well as market shocks exposed
to the ﬁrm. In view of this general setting of asset-value dynamics, our approach
is distinct from those of the traditional structural credit risk models (e.g., Mer-
ton (1974), Black and Cox (1976)), in which the asset return is speciﬁed as
an exogenous process, usually a log-normal process with constant volatility.
Moreover, our modeling strategy is diﬀerent from models with completely en-
dogenous asset-value dynamics, such as that in Basak and Shapiro (2003), in
that the market impacts on the asset return of the ﬁrm are also emphasized
here.
When using structural models for credit risk, a diﬃculty arises in calculating
the hitting (default) probability when the asset dynamics are other than log-
normal. In order to overcome this problem and to provide a tractable dynamic
framework for implementation, we adopt a reduced form credit risk model for
pricing the debt (bonds) issued by a ﬁrm. In particular, a simple point pro-
cess with stochastic jump intensity is applied to modeling defaults as originally
proposed in Lando (1998). The intensity of this default indicator process is
again mutually determined both by the ﬁrm’s investment risk exposure and by
macroeconomic factors.
Another factor that we consider is the existence of information asymmetry
between market investors and ﬁrm managers. More speciﬁcally, it is assumed
that market investors have information on macroeconomic factors (e.g., risk-free
interest rates) and a part of the ﬁrm’s information that is shared by the market.
1However, they have no access to the information about the ﬁrm’s investment
decisions. Due to the lack of information, they would demand an extra yield on
the bonds issued by the ﬁrm. Since the investment decisions aﬀect the future
asset return and default risk of the ﬁrm, the manager’s inside information brings
an inconsistency between the two parties on the values of the debt issued. It is
reasonable to assume that the debt is issued according to the investor’s price.
For the ﬁrm’s managers, their investment decisions may create an advantage
on the price of the debt if they increase the investment risk, a phenomenon
called the “asset substitution eﬀect” in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Meanwhile,
however, an increase in investment risk exposure will lead to a potential asset
loss upon default. Here default, or a credit event, typically includes bankcruptcy,
failure to meet its cash obligations or restructuring. Therefore there exists a
trade-oﬀ when choosing investment strategies to balance these two opposing
eﬀects. This paper focuses principally on the problem of determining an optimal
investment policy in this context with the goal of maximizing the ﬁrm’s equity
value.
The partial information about the ﬁrm shared by market investors, as men-
tioned above, is characterized in a reduced form; i.e., we import a credit index
process for each ﬁrm to characterize its credit quality information that market
investors can access. This idea was ﬁrst proposed by Hull and White (2002)
to measure a ﬁrm’s default risk. Chen and Filipovi´ c (2003a, 2003b) proposed
a speciﬁc aﬃne model of credit indices for both single-party and multi-entities,
in which they show how to derive a ﬁrm’s credit index value from the corre-
sponding bond spreads and demonstrate that the credit index value of a ﬁrm is
generally consistent with its investment grade given by ﬁnancial agencies (e.g.,
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s). Similar work can also be found in Albanese
et al. (2003) and Rouady and Jeanblanc (2002). Here we use the same setting
as in Chen and Filipovi´ c (2003a); that is, we assume that the higher the credit
index value, the worse a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation, and a zero value of the cor-
responding credit index implies perfect ﬁnancial health of a ﬁrm. Note that the
credit index in this paper is treated as the synthesis of all the ﬁrm speciﬁc infor-
mation accessible to the market; however, in order to capture macroeconomic
factors, we also consider the short rate as another state variable. Together with
the credit index of a ﬁrm, these two variables are modeled by a positive two-
dimensional aﬃne process. A general extension to modeling macroeconomic
factors as a multi-variable model is straightforward to derive. However, the
one-factor short rate model considered here is suﬃcient for our purposes.
A related line of work on capital structure theory can be traced back as
early as to Modigliani and Miller (M-M)(1958, 1963) who derive the optimal
amount of debt by balancing the tax deductions from interest payments against
the default costs. Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a comprehensive survey on
2diﬀerent variants of the original M-M model. More recently, Leland (1994),
Leland and Toft (1996), and Leland (1998) examine corporate debt values and
capital structure in a uniﬁed analytical structural framework and derive the debt
valuation formula and optimal leverage for a ﬁrm. Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
investigate the interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-
theoretic setting and study the eﬀects of dividend policies on debt valuation.
A remarkable and insightful work on modeling a ﬁrm is that of Jarrow and
Purnanandam (2003), in which the authors diﬀerentiate the ﬁnance distress and
insolvency, and demonstrate the existence of the ﬁnance distress state provides
the ﬁrm the hedging incentives. However, their formulation is too general for
implementation, and the authors have not considered the issue of asymmetric
information, which is one of the main focuses of this paper.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model and discuss debt valuation issues in detail. In Section 3, we formulate
the ﬁrm’s optimization problem and derive the optimal investment strategy
and its capital structure. In Section 4, we generalize the original model to
allow consideration of optimal dividend policies and tax eﬀects on investment
decisions. Two speciﬁc examples are discussed in Section 5 to illustrate the
implementation of our model and the general consistency between our reduced
form methodology and the structural framework. A brief conclusion is given in
Section 6.
2 The Model
Consider a continuous trading economy with ﬁnite time horizon [0;T ¤] and
a ﬁltered probability space (Ω;(Ft)0·t·T ¤;F;P) representing the randomness
in the economy during this time horizon. Suppose there exists an equivalent
martingale measure Q and a risk-free short rate process rt, which, under measure
Q, follows the same dynamics as in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985):




where br, ¯r and ¾ are constants, and Wr is an adapted Q-Brownian motion.
Here j¯rj represents the mean reversion rate of the short rate to the long-run
mean j br
¯rj. Therefore at time t ¸ 0, the price of a risk-free zero-coupon bond
with time to maturity T ¡ t (T > t) can be written as follows:
¼(t;T) = expfÁT(T ¡ t) + ÃT
r (T ¡ t)rtg; (2)
3where
ÃT
r (T ¡ t) =
2(1 ¡ e°r(T¡t))
(°r ¡ ¯r)(e°r(T¡t) ¡ 1) + 2°r
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As mentioned above, in order to model the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information shared
by market investors, we apply and deﬁne the credit index Yt of a ﬁrm following
the process





by, ¯y, ¯ry and ¾y are constants, and Wy is again an adapted Q-Brownian
motion independent of Wr. The constant ¯ry ¸ 0 measures the correlation
between the short rate and the credit index process1.
2.1 Modeling Investment Options
It is assumed that, at time 0, a ﬁrm of interest is faced with diﬀerent investment
options. In order to derive an optimal decision about how to choose among these
investments, each optional investment project is characterized by its unique risk
exposure factor ®, and the associated initial capital requirement is denoted by
I(®). Let B denote the set of investment decisions open to the ﬁrm managers;
thus ® 2 B. The impact of an investment opportunity on the dynamics of the
ﬁrm’s asset return is modeled as follows.
Assumption 1. It is assumed that B is a compact subset of R+. Moreover,
given the decision ® 2 B at time 0, the asset return obeys the following dynamics
under the equivalent martingale measure Q:
dAt
At




t ; A0 = I(®); (4)
where At denotes the asset value at time t of a ﬁrm invested in investment
project ®, G : B 7! R+ is an increasing function characterizing the excessive
growth rate, ¾A is a constant, and WA denotes a Q-Brownian motion which is
mutually independent of Wr and Wy. Moreover, it is assumed that the function
I : B 7! R+ is also increasing.
This formulation of investment return dynamics is in the spirit of several
important and well-accepted economic facts. First, the entire dynamics of the
return not only depends on the ﬁrm’s investment strategy and its ﬁnancial
health (measured by the credit index Yt), but also is related to macroeconomic
4situations (measured by the short-term interest rate rt). In view of the intrin-
sic interdependence between a ﬁrm’s return and its ﬁnancial credit quality, we
model the asset return process by setting its volatility to be directly related to
the credit index. Meanwhile, the volatility of the return also depends on the
risk exposure factor ® of a speciﬁc investment strategy, which we use to charac-
terize each investment decision uniquely. By requiring G(®) to be an increasing
function, the model is consistent with the economic intuition that the investors
will require a higher return when taking a higher risk. This intuition has been
demonstrated by Vassalou and Xing (2003) for stock investors. Furthermore,
since G(®) is positive, we admit that a ﬁrm may have arbitrage opportunities
usually generated by its special expertise in the area (e.g., patents). As argued
in Jarrow and Purnanandam (2003), under some circumstances, given arbitrage
opportunities, the ﬁrm can become inﬁnitely large with zero capital necessary.
Therefore, to exclude this situation, we stipulate that there exists an initial cap-
ital requirement I(®) for each investment option ®. Requiring that the function
I be increasing implies that a higher expected return needs a higher initial input.
Besides this formulation, we also limit the arbitrage opportunities by proposing
the following assumption on default.
Assumption 2. Let TD denote the default time of a ﬁrm. It is assumed that the
default indicator 1fTD·tg follows a doubly stochastic point process with stochastic
intensity Λt = ` + ¸rrt + ¸yYt + J(®), where the constants `;¸r, and ¸y are
non-negative, and the function J : B 7! R+ is increasing.
Thus, Assumption 2 indicates that the riskier the investment strategy chosen,
the higher the ﬁrm’s default risk as characterized by the extra jump intensity
J(®). However, this assumption also includes the macroeconomic inﬂuence on
a ﬁrm’s default intensity, as well as the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health. This modeling
strategy is diﬀerent from those proposed in Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft
(1996), in which the default (boundary) is determined endogenously by the ﬁrm.
Remark 1. According to Jarrow and Purnanandam (2003), the intensity com-
ponent J(®) + ` can be partially interpreted as the operational or disaster risk
caused by malfeasance of management or by an unexpected structural shift in
the economy.
2.2 Debt Valuation for Firm Managers
In order to apply valuation formulas proposed by Lando (1998), we make the
following technical assumption.
Assumption 3. It is assumed that the information set for ﬁrm managers at
time t is represented by Ft, where Ft = Ht _ Nt with Ht := ¾f(rs;Ys;As) : 0 ·
s · tg and Nt := ¾f1fTD·sg : 0 · s · tg, for each t 2 [0;T ¤].
5Under this assumption, we have the following lemma, due to Lando (1998).
Lemma 1. For any 0 · t < T, and any T-contingent claim with random payoﬀ










From Lemma 1, we can derive the following proposition concerning debt
valuation by ﬁrm managers.
Proposition 1. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, the price of a zero-coupon bond









= (1 ¡ ±f)¼f(®;t;T)1fTD>tg + ±f¼(t;T); (6)
where ±f denotes the recovery rate and
¼f(®;t;T) = expfÁf(T ¡ t) + Ãf
r(T ¡ t)rt + Ãf
y(T ¡ t)Ytg (7)
with Áf, Ãf
r and Ãf



































y(t) ¡ ¸y; Ãf
y(0) = 0:
(8)
Remark 2. It is, of course, quite convenient for implementation if explicit
expressions are known for the exponent functions Áf, Ãf
r and Ãf
y. If ¯ry = 0 in
(8), we can obtain such expressions, namely,
Ãf
r(t) =
2(¸r + 1)(1 ¡ e˜ °rt)
˜ °r(e˜ °rt + 1) ¡ ¯r(e˜ °rt ¡ 1)






























(°y ¡ ¯y)(e°yt ¡ 1) + 2°y
¶
¡ (` + J(®))t:
(9)
62.3 Debt Valuation from the Market’s Perspective
As mentioned above, since market investors do not have access to a ﬁrm’s asset
information and its managers’ investment strategy, the “rational” debt price
for market investors is diﬀerent from that of the ﬁrm managers. The following
assumption speciﬁes this diﬀerence.
Assumption 4. It is assumed that the information known to the market in-
vestors at time t is given by Gt := ¾f(rs;Ys) : 0 · s · tg, for t 2 [0;T].
Moreover due to the lack of information on investment decision ®, investors
use the default intensity
Λ¤
t = `¤ + ¸¤
rrt + ¸¤
yYt;
where, for simplicity, it is assumed that
`¤ = `; ¸¤
r = ¸r; ¸¤
y = ¸y:
Assumption 4 postulates that market investors will value the debt under his
own pricing measure with the dynamics of the default diﬀerent from that used
by the ﬁrm’s managers. Since this measure is diﬀerent from the martingale
measure of the ﬁrm, it follows that the market investors’ valuation is biased.
However, it is further assumed that the investor demands an extra yield `e ¸ 0
on the bonds.
Following Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, from the market’s perspective, we
obtain the price of a zero-coupon bond as follows:
Bm(t;T) = e¡`e(T¡t)[(1 ¡ ±m)¼m(t;T)1fTD>tg + ±m¼(t;T)]; (10)
where ±m denotes the recovery rate, and it is assumed that ± := ±m = ±f, and
¼m(t;T) = expfÁm(T ¡ t) + Ãm
r (T ¡ t)rt + Ãm
y (T ¡ t)Ytg (11)
with Ám, Ãm
r and Ãm




r (t) + byÃm











r (t) + ¯ryÃm
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y (t) ¡ ¸y; Ãm
y (0) = 0:
(12)
Comparing (12) with (8), it is straightforward to show that
Ãm
r (t) = Ãf
r(t); Ãm
y (t) = Ãf
y(t); Ám(t) = Áf(t) + J(®)t:
7Therefore we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 2, 3 and 4, if a ﬁrm does not default at
time t, the diﬀerence on the debt (with time to maturity T ¡ t) value between










In particular, if we assume zero-recovery upon default (i.e., ± = 0) we further
have
·(®;t;T) = e(`e¡J(®))(T¡t): (14)
Since it is reasonable to assume that the debt will be issued according to
the price given by market investors, from Proposition 2 we can see that ﬁrm
managers may increase the risk factor ® to increase J(®) so that they can
obtain a price advantage (i.e., J(®) > `e) when issuing the debt due to the
limited information held by market investors.
2.4 Default Costs
As is well known (e.g., Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Goldstein, Ju and
Leland (2001)), default is costly due to deadweight losses including third party
costs, liquidation costs, agency costs, etc. In this paper, these costs will be
taken as exogenously given. In particular, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5. It is assumed that when default occurs before the terminal date
of an investment with exposure factor ®, the default costs consist of two parts:
a ﬁxed component ½0(®), and another component related to the investment asset
½1(®)AT, where T is the terminal date of the investment, and ½0 : B 7! R+ and
½1 : B 7! [0;1] are increasing functions.
The ﬁxed (ﬁrst) part of the costs can be related to legal and other fees
associated with default, and the ﬂexible (second ) part can be related to the
depreciation of the asset due to the liquidation costs. It is assumed that the
deadweight losses on the asset occur at the terminal date of the investment if
a ﬁrm defaults before. Therefore the expected default loss is derived in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let T denote the terminal date of the investment. Under As-
8sumption 5, we have the expected default cost at time t(t < T) given by






where ¼(t;T) and ¼f(®;t;T) are deﬁned in (2) and (7), and
¼a(®;t;T) = expfÁa(T ¡ t) + Ãa
r(T ¡ t)rt + Ãa
y(T ¡ t)Ytg (16)
with Áa, Ãa
r and Ãa
































y(t) ¡ ¸y; Ãa
y(0) = 0:
(17)
With these results in hand, we are now ready to set up and solve the invest-
ment optimization problem for the ﬁrm.
3 Optimal Investment Decision
In this section, we ﬁx the current time at 0 and assume that the ﬁrm has not
defaulted yet. At time 0, the ﬁrm is faced with various investment options
represented by the decision set B, and all these investment projects share the
same terminal date denoted by T0. Suppose that at time 0, the ﬁrm holds initial
capital C0 in hand; however, for simplicity, it is assumed that this initial capital
can not exceed the initial investment requirement for any investment project;
i.e.,
C0 · I(®); 8 ® 2 B:
Therefore, in order to carry out the investment project, the ﬁrm needs to raise
funds externally. As mentioned in the previous section, it is assumed ﬁrst that
equity capital is inelastic, which implies that the investment can only be ﬁ-
nanced by issuing debt. As mentioned in Jarrow and Purnanandam (2003),
this restriction can be easily relaxed by setting the initial capital C0 to be a
ﬂexible function dependent on state variables ® and Y0, which will be discussed
below. It is further assumed that the ﬁrm will issue a zero-coupon bond for
debt ﬁnancing with maturity T0 and face value L.
Using the results in Section 2 and the initial budget constraint, we can
determine the debt face value L needed to be issued. Without considering the




0 is the debt value viewed by the market, which is assumed to be the
sale price of the debt. From (10), we have that
Lm
0 = L ¢ Bm(0;T0); (18)
where Bm(0;T) is deﬁned in (10). It follows that the debt face value L necessary




which is due at time T0.
3.1 Firm’s Objective Function
The ﬁrm managers will act to serve the interests of shareholders, and therefore
we assume that the objective of the ﬁrm is to maximize the present value of
equity at time T0. Since the equity is equal to the asset value less liabilities,






















; A0 = I(®): (20)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side (RHS) of (19) is the expected value of the
asset considering the deadweight losses upon default. The second term is the
expected value of the liability. Note that due to the information asymmetry, the
value of the debt issued is not equal to Lm
0 from the ﬁrm managers’ perspec-

























Remark 3. It is obvious to see that there exists an optimal solution for (21) if
10the decision set B has ﬁnitely many elements.
3.2 The Optimal Choice of Investment Strategy
In view of Remark 3, we assume that the following regularity conditions hold
throughout the remainder of the paper. This assumption allows us to solve the
optimization problem (21) analytically.
Assumption 6. It is assumed that the decision set B = [0;B0] for some B0 > 0,
and that the functions G;I;J;½0, and ½1 are in C2(B).
Now we ﬁrst obtain the analytical expression of the objective function F in
terms of ®. This derivation is straightforward from Propositions 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. The objective function F of a ﬁrm deﬁned in (19) admits the fol-
lowing explicit expression.
F(®) = (1 ¡ ½1(®))I(®)eG(®)T0 + ½0(®)¼f(®;0;T0) + ½1(®)I(®)¼a(®;0;T0)
¡ ·(®;0;T0)(I(®) ¡ C0) ¡ ½0(®)¼(0;T0);
(22)
where ¼(0;T0), ¼f(®;0;T0) and ¼a(®;0;T0) are deﬁned in (2), (7) and (16),
respectively, and ·(®;0;T0) can be found in (13). Moreover, since the functions
G;I;J;½0, and ½1 are continuous with respect to ®, so is F, and therefore F has
a maximum on the compact set [0;B0].
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (22) is increasing with respect to ®, the second
term is decreasing in ®, while the third and fourth terms are not monotonic
in ®. A straightforward approach to the optimization problem is to obtain the
ﬁrst order condition. By diﬀerentiating F with respect to ®, we have the ﬁrst
order optimality condition as
0 = I0(®)
h















¡ ½0(®)J0(®)T0¼f(®;0;T0) ¡ (I(®) ¡ C0)·0(®;0;T0);
(23)




a(®;0;T0) = (G0(®) ¡ J0(®))T0¼a(®;0;T0);
which follow from (7), (8), (16) and (46). Although it is easy to solve (23)
numerically given the functions G;I;J;½0, and ½1, it is diﬀerent to tell how
11those other factors (e.g., the deadweight loss ½0; ½1 or initial capital C0) aﬀect
the determination of the optimal decision ®¤. In order to see this, we assume
zero recovery rate upon default2; i.e., ± = 0. Then the objective function can
be further simpliﬁed as






½0(®)Γ1(x;T0) + (C0 ¡ I(®))e`eT0¤
e¡J(®)T0 ¡ ½0(®)¼(0;T0);
(24)
where x := (r0;Y0) and
Γ1(x;T0) = expf˜ Áf(T0) + Ãf
r(T0)r0 + Ãf
y(T0)Y0g;




˜ Áf(T0) = Áf(T0) + J(®)T0; ˜ Áa(T0) = Áa(T0) ¡ (G(®) ¡ J(®))T0:
In view of (8) and (46), the functions Γ1(x;T0) and Γ2(x;T0) are independent of
®. Therefore (24) enables us to clarify the relationship between diﬀerent factors
and the optimal decision ®¤. The ﬁrst term on the RHS of (24) represents
the expected return of the initial investment, which increases when the risk-
exposure rises. And thus this term may encourage ﬁrm managers to opt for
a more aggressive investment strategy. The second term comes from the dead
weight loss due to the liquidation incurred from default. From the general
theory of Riccati equations (see e.g., Birkhoﬀ and Rota (1989)), we know that
Γ2(x;T0) 2 (0;1], for each x 2 R2
+ and T0 2 R+. Therefore the second term is
decreasing with respect to ®, which implies that the default cost factor ½1(®) will
force ﬁrm managers to reach a more conservative investment policy. Compared
with the ﬁrst two terms, the eﬀect of ® on the third term is rather complicated.
Generally speaking, in order to avoid a huge default loss on the initial capital
and decrease the likelihood of a ﬁxed default cost expense, the ﬁrm will tend
to choose the investment project with low risk. However, if for all ® 2 B,
(I(®) ¡ C0)e`eT0 ¡ ½0(®)Γ1(x;T0) ¸ 0, then driven by price advantages gained
from liability holders due to the market investors’ biased price for purchasing the
debt, the ﬁrm prefers to choose higher-risk strategy. Since we already assume
that
I(®) ¸ C0; 8 ® 2 B; (25)
from the above discussion, we can see that the ﬁxed default cost ½0(®) serves as
a wedge to make ﬁrm managers hesitate to increase the risk exposure of their
investment. This result is consistent with the one in Basak and Shapiro (2003).
The optimal investment strategy is, of course, derived by balancing all of the
12above factors.
4 General Extensions of the Model
In this section, we discuss several possible extensions of the original model to
incorporate some other elements when determining the investment risk exposure
®.
4.1 Equity Capital, Dividend Policy and Capital Reserve
As mentioned above, the external source of fund raising may not be restricted
to debt ﬁnancing; issuing additional equity can be an alternative means of fund
raising despite the extra costs due to market imperfections. Moreover, dividend
policies and capital reserve have also been ignored in the above analysis. Now
we will generalize the model to take these factors into account. Since the div-
idends are paid to shareholders, the objective function of the ﬁrm will become
the expected value of equity plus the dividend paid currently. In fact, if we
assume that the reserved capital is kept in a risk-free money market savings
account (with the growth rate equal to the short rate), and it is not subject to
a deadweight loss at default, then this reserved capital is equivalent to the divi-
dend in terms of their having identical present expected values 3. Therefore we

























with the budget constraint
˜ Lm
0 + C0 + Ce(®;d) = I(®) + d; A0 = I(®);
where d denotes the dividends paid at time 0, ˜ Lm
0 denotes the expected value
of the debt ˜ L from the market investors’ perspective, and Ce(®;d) represents
the additional equity capital raised by the ﬁrm. On assuming that Ce is a
positive and increasing function of the dividend d, it follows that equity capital
is costly, but is neither perfectly elastic nor inelastic, as mentioned in Jarrow
and Purnanandam (2003). Again from (10), we have that
˜ L =
I(®) ¡ C0 ¡ Ce(®;d) + d
Bm(0;T0)
:
13Therefore, on further assuming Ce 2 C2(B £ R+), it is straightforward to solve






; 8 (®;d) 2 B £ R+
in order to exclude the case in which the initial equity capital is suﬃcient to
cover any level of investment.
4.2 Coupon Payments and Tax Beneﬁts
In Section 3, we presumed that the ﬁrm issues debt in the form of zero-coupon
bonds. However, in order to beneﬁt from the tax deductibility of coupon pay-
ments, a ﬁrm usually chooses to issue debts with coupons, and liability holders
also prefer to invest in bonds with interest payments. Let » denote the coupon
payment rate and ∆ represent the interval between two adjacent coupon pay-
ment dates. It is assumed that T0 = N ¢∆ and there is zero-recovery at default.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that `e = 0, otherwise we can specify
˜ J(®) = J(®) ¡ `e instead of the original J(®). It is easy to derive the coupon




» ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼m(0;i∆) + ¼m(0;T0); (27)
where ¼m is deﬁned in (11). However, a ﬁrm can beneﬁt fully4 from the tax
deductions provided by interest payments. Therefore the debt value from the




(1 ¡ ¿)» ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼f(®;0;i∆) + ¼f(®;0;T0); (28)
where ¿» is the tax beneﬁt and ¼f is deﬁned by (7). Thus the ratio between






i=1(1 ¡ ¿)» ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼f(®;0;i∆) + ¼f(®;0;T0)
PN
i=1 » ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼m(0;i∆) + ¼m(0;T0)
: (29)
Since ¼f(®;0;T0)=¼m(0;T0)¢e¡J(®)T0, ·c(®;0;T0) decreases as T0 increases, and
it follows that short term debt does not exploit the tax beneﬁts as completely
as long term debt. Moreover it is easy to see that the optimization problem (22)
does not change except for replacing ·(®;0;T0) with ·c(®;0;T0). Therefore a
14ﬁrm will prefer to issue debt with coupon payments if and only if ·c(®;0;T0) <
·(®;0;T0).





i=1(1 ¡ ¿)» ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼f(®;0;i∆) + ¼f(®;0;T0)
PN
i=1 » ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼m(0;i∆) + ¼m(0;T0)
=
PN
i=1(1 ¡ ¿)» ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼m(0;i∆)eJ(®)(N¡i)∆ + ¼m(0;T0)
PN
i=1 » ¢ ∆ ¢ ¼m(0;i∆) + ¼m(0;T0)
:(30)
Now it is easy to see that ·c(®;0;T0) < ·(®;0;T0) if and only if





which implies that ﬁrm managers will not take advantage of tax beneﬁts by
issuing coupon bonds unless the deduction amount is large enough compared
with the threshold given in (31). On the other hand, from (31), we can see that
the riskier the investment strategy chosen, the larger is this threshold, and thus
the more likely that ﬁrm managers will issue zero-coupon bonds. This result
is consistent with the result provided by the M-M model that there exists a
tradeoﬀ between tax beneﬁts and external costs of potential default.
4.3 Applications in Portfolio Management
In reality, a ﬁrm is faced with only ﬁnitely many investment opportunities.
However, this does not mean that the decision set B deﬁned previously is ﬁnite.
By diversifying the investment and setting up an appropriate portfolio, ﬁrm
managers can choose any risk exposure ® in a convex region. The following
discussion shows how to relate the risk exposure factor ®, the initial investment
requirement I(®) and the excessive growth rate G(®) to the portfolio position
held by the ﬁrm. For simplicity, it is assumed that ¾A = 0 in (4).
Suppose there are M investment options with return dynamics and initial
input requirements given by
dVi(t)
Vi(t)
= (rt + ¹i)dt + ¾idWi
t; Vi(0) ¸ vi; (32)
where i 2 f1;2;:::;Mg, ¹ := (¹1;:::;¹M)T 2 RM, ¾ := diag(¾1;:::;¾M) 2
R
M£M
+ , and W := (W1;W 2;:::;W M) denotes an M-dimensional standard Q-
Brownian motion. It is assumed that ¹1 = 0 and ¾1 = 0, which represents




i=1 µi = 1. Then by Itˆ o’s Lemma, it is easy to
15deduce that the dynamics of the investment asset value A are described by
dAt
At
= (rt + hµ;¹i)dt + hµ;¾dWti: (33)
By comparing (33) with (4), we have that






and the decision set B = [0;¾¤], where ¾¤ = maxf¾1;¾2;:::;¾Mg. Moreover we
can also derive the initial investment requirement as follows:







Therefore we transform the original optimization problem of determining the
optimal risk exposure ® into the optimization problem of choosing the portfolio
µ. Using the method proposed previously, the optimal portfolio position of a
ﬁrm can be derived straightforwardly.
5 Simple Examples
In order to illustrate the determination of the optimal investment risk exposure
® using the model proposed in this paper, we will take several simple examples
and solve the corresponding optimization problem.
5.1 Proportional Deadweight Losses
The ﬁrst example is given by the following additional assumptions to simplify
the problem.
Assumption 7. It is assumed that the decision set B = [0;10], `e = 0, ¾A = 0
in (4), and
G(®) = G0 log(1 + ®); I(®) = C0(1 + ®); J(®) = J0 ¢ ®;
½0(®) = ½0 ¤ ® ¤ C0; ½1(®) = 1 ¡ e¡½1®:
Moreover the ﬁrm will issue the debt in the form of zero-coupon bonds with zero
default recovery, and dividends are not paid.
The maximal risk exposure factor ® is set at 10, which means that the max-
imal volatility of asset return is around 300% given by the investment risk. We
can see that all those functions set in Assumption 7 are positive and increasing,
16as already presumed in the previous discussion, and that the function I satis-
ﬁes I(®) ¸ C0, for all ® 2 B, which is consistent with (25). Meanwhile, from
Assumption 7, we can see that G(0) = ½0(0) = ½1(0) = 0, which implies that
when a ﬁrm chooses the risk-free investment, the excessive growth rate is equal
to zero, as are deadweight losses. Now from (24), it follows that the objective
function is given by
F(®) = C0
¡
e¡½1® + (1 ¡ e¡½1®)Γ2(x;T0)e¡J0®¢T0¢
(1 + ®)G0T0+1
+ C0(½0Γ1(x;T0) ¡ 1)®e¡J0®¢T0 ¡ ½0C0®¼(0;T0):
(36)
Without loss of generality, we set C0 = 1. In order to solve the optimization
problem numerically, we need to preset several parameters. For the structural
parameters (br;by;¯r;¯y;¯ry;¾r;¾y;`;¸r;¸y), their values are taken from the
empirical results in Chen and Filipovi´ c (2003a); i.e.,
¾r = 5:89 £ 10¡3; ¾y = 2:555;
br = 0:01167; by = 1:6328 £ 10¡5;
¯r = ¡0:15492; ¯ry = 0:23006; ¯y = ¡1:472;
` = 0; ¸r = 0:26365; ¸y = 0:10613;
r0 = 0:05; Y0 = 0:07 (corresponding to Aaa credit rating):
These estimates are provided by empirical testing across more than 650 corpo-
rate bonds and 150 treasury bonds. The parameter G0 is set at 0:06, and thus
we have
eG(10) = (1 + 10)G0 = 1:15;
which means that, under the martingale measure Q, the maximal yearly ex-
pected return of the investment asset is around 15% over that of the risk-free
money market account. Moreover the parameter J0 is set to be equal to 0.2.
Since eJ(10) = e10¢J0 = 7:4, this means the most risky investment decision
(® = 10) can increase default risk at most seven times.
First we examine the relationship between the risk exposure factor ® and the
objective function F. We ﬁx T0 = 1, and plot the function F(®) when choosing
three diﬀerent sets of deadweight loss factors: ½0 and ½1. The result is shown
in Figure 1. We can see that the objective function is a smooth function with a
non-trival5 maximum in the region [0;10].
[Figure 1 about here.]
Moreover it is clear to see the optimal investment risk exposure ®¤ and the
maximal expected equity value F(®¤) both decrease when the deadweight loss
factors ½0 and ½1 increase. This is consistent with the intuition that a ﬁrm will
decrease its risk exposure if default losses rise.
17Now we start to investigate the relationship between ®¤ and ½0, ½1, respec-
tively. Figures 2 and 3 show explicitly that the optimal investment risk factor ®
and the maximum of the objective function are monotonically decreasing with
respect to both loss factors ½0 and ½1. Actually we can also see that the optimal
choice of the risk exposure of investment is more sensitive to the default losses
proportional to the asset than to the ﬁxed component of default costs.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Finally, we examine the impact of the investment span T0 on the optimal
strategy. Figure 4 shows the change of the optimal risk exposure ®¤ and the
objective function F(®¤) with respect to increases in T0. Unexpectedly, we ﬁnd
that ®¤ does not have a monotonic relationship with the span T0. As T0 increases
from one year to four years, ﬁrm managers should reduce the risk-exposure ®¤
ﬁrst due to the dramatic increase of default risk at the order of J(®)e¡J(®)T0.
However, as T0 exceeds four years, ﬁrm managers should increase the invest-
ment risk exposure in view of the higher expected asset return, although the
default risk also rises. Therefore as the investment span increases, the optimal
risk exposure ®¤ is determined by balancing these two opposing eﬀects. The
monotonic relationship between the maximal equity value F(®¤) and the in-
vestment span T0 shown in Figure 4 is easy to understand since the longer the
investment span, the more return the investors demand.
[Figure 3 about here.]
5.2 The Alternative Cap-Type of Deadweight Losses
The following example is examined in order to be compared with the case that
is discussed in detail in Purnanandam (2003) using the traditional structural
framework. Instead of the previous assumption of proportional deadweight
losses, the default cost is alternatively assumed as
CD(T) = (AT ¡ M)+1fTD·Tg;
and the initial capital requirement I(®) is ﬁxed at 3C0 regardless of the in-
vestment risk exposure ®, while the excess growth rate G(®), the extra jump
intensity J(®) and other variables follow the same settings as in the previous
example. Therefore in this case, the ﬁnal gain of the investment is capped by
a positive bound M in the event of default, which implies that the smaller this
bound, the larger the potential deadweight loss. In this case, we can also de-
rive the objective function of the ﬁrm as follows, and the detailed formulas are

















0 rsds[(AT0 ¡ M)+ ¡ (AT0 ¡ M)+1fTD>T0g]
i
¡ (I(®) ¡ C0)e¡J(®)T0
= 3C0eG(®)T0 ¡ (Q1(®;x;T0) ¡ MQ2(®;x;T0))
































The explicit formulas for Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 are given in the appendix using
the Fourier transform analysis as shown by (47)-(50).
By maximizing the objective function (37) with respect to diﬀerent default
cost factors M, the relationship between the optimal investment risk exposure
®¤ and the bound M is displayed in Figure 5. In contrast to the monotonic
relationship between ®¤ and the deadweight loss factors ½0 and ½1 in the pro-
portional deadweight loss case, we ﬁnd a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship
between the optimal risk exposure and the default cost factor M. Purnanandam
(2003) also obtain the similar result in the structural framework. While it is
quite intuitive to see that when the bound M is larger, the ﬁrm will choose a
larger risk exposure, since potential default cost is smaller, it is necessary to
elaborate the reason why the ﬁrm will still choose the high risk exposure when
the default loss becomes signiﬁcant large. When M is close to the liability, the
equity value of a ﬁrm becomes a barrier option whose value is increasing in the
volatility of the asset value. Therefore in the high deadweight loss circumstance,
the ﬁrm may choose the high risk exposure. However, this conjecture needs to
seek the further empirical evidence to support. Moreover, this example shows
that our methodology generally produces consistent results as in the structural
framework, but with a lot more tractability in terms of the implementations6
[Figure 4 about here.]
196 Conclusion
In the setting of information asymmetry between ﬁrm managers and market
investors, this paper has developed a reduced model to analyze the optimal
investment policy and capital structure while considering dividends and tax
eﬀects. The reduced form methodology facilitates the implementation as well
as the theoretical analysis.
Under the model we have established, debt values (from the ﬁrm managers’
point of view) and issuing prices (from market investors’ perspective) are both
derived in closed form. Due to the inside information held by ﬁrm managers,
they may issue the debt at higher price by increasing their investment risk. We
demonstrate that ﬁrm managers determine their optimal investment risk ex-
posure by balancing two opposing factors: the pricing advantages gained from
the liability holders, and deadweight losses upon the default. Because of the
tractability of the model, the solution to this optimization problem has easily
been characterized and is straightforward to solve numerically. Moreover we
have generalized our model to consider tax eﬀects and optimal dividend poli-
cies. We have found that unless the tax beneﬁt is large enough, the ﬁrm would
still choose issuing zero-coupon bonds, and that threshold has also been derived.
Moreover we have discussed the applications of our model in portfolio manage-
ment and have provided two simple examples to show the tractability of the
model in practice and their general consistency with the structural framework.
However, the latter one is rather hard for implementations. An interesting di-
rection for future research is the empirical implementation of the model through
estimation of a ﬁrm’s model parameters.
A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the proofs of the propositions given in this paper.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1






























0 (rs+Λs)ds is an H-martingale up to time T, by Itˆ o’s lemma













@Y 2 + (br + ¯rr)
@¼f
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¡ (r + Λ)¼f; ¼f(®;T;T) = 1:
(40)
Now suppose
¼f(®;t;T) = expfÁf(T ¡ t) + Ãf
r(T ¡ t)rt + Ãf
y(T ¡ t)Ytg:
On substituting this form into (40)and separating variables, we see in order to
satisfy (40), it is necessary and suﬃcient that the functions Áf(t), Ãf
r(t), and
Ãf
y(t) solve the Ricatti equations deﬁned in (8). Therefore we completes the
proof. ¤
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3












































= ¼(t;T) ¡ ¼f(®;t;T)1fTD>tg:






















































21Then, with similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have the
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¡ (r + Λ)S; ST = AT:
(41)
Now suppose that
St = At expfÁa(T ¡ t) + Ãa
r(T ¡ t)rt + Ãa
y(T ¡ t)Ytg:
Then, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for S to satisfy (41) is that the func-
tions Áa(t), Ãa
r(t), and Ãa
y(t) solve the Ricatti equations deﬁned in (46). ¤
A.3 Derivations of Equations (33), (34) and (35)
Since A =
PM
i=1 Ai, where Ai = µiA for each i 2 f1;2;:::;Mg, and
dAi(t)
Ai(t)
= (rt + ¹i)dt + ¾idW i
t;














(rt + ¹i)dt + ¾idW i
t
¤
= At [(rt + hµ;¹idt + hµ;¾dWti]; (42)
which is (33). In (34), the function G(®) is easy to see, while ® can be obtained


























t is a Q-Brownian motion given by L´ evy’s Characteri-
zation theorem. Therefore (34) is proved. Finally since we have the initial
constraint on Ai(0) ¸ vi, for each i 2 f1;2;:::;Mg, (35) is straightforward to
derive. ¤
22A.4 Derivations of the Q Functions in (37)
Here we will apply the Fourier transform analysis used in Heston (1993), and


































where Im(c) denotes the imaginary part of c 2 C.















(a + jºb)2 + brÃc
r(t) + byÃc



























y(t) ¡ ¸2; Ãc
y(0) = 0:
(46)
Therefore Φa;b can explicitly calculated from Áa;b through the Fourier inversion
(44). Finally by (38) and Lemma 1, we have
Q1(®;x;T0) = Φ1;¡1(¡ln(M);x;2C0;T0;0;1;0); (47)
Q2(®;x;T0) = Φ0;¡1(¡ln(M);x;2C0;T0;0;1;0); (48)
Q3(®;x;T0) = Φ1;¡1(¡ln(M);x;2C0;T0;` + J(®);1 + ¸r;¸y); (49)
Q4(®;x;T0) = Φ0;¡1(¡ln(M);x;2C0;T0;` + J(®);1 + ¸r;¸y); (50)
so that the objective function F(®) in (37) can be explicitly calculated. ¤
23Notes
1In order to retain the positivity of Yt, we restrict ¯ry to be positive.
2Similar results are obtained under a non-zero recovery assumption but the
analysis is more involved.
3Strictly speaking, capital reserve may decrease the deadweight loss cost due
to liquidation; however this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
4According to U.S. tax codes, tax deductibility on coupon payments must be
subject to the condition that a ﬁrm produces earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) at least as large as the coupon payment » for a ﬁscal year, which is not
considered in this paper. For detail, see Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001).
5The maximum is not obtained at either end of the region.
6In the structural framework, even the case of proportional deadweight losses
is hard to be solved without Monte Carlo simulations.
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Figure 1: The objective function F as a function of risk exposure ®.
The objective functions F are plotted for three diﬀerent sets of deadweight loss
factors: ½0 = 0:1;½1 = 0:15, ½0 = 0:12;½1 = 0:3 and ½0 = 0:15;½1 = 0:5. Here
T0 is ﬁxed at 1, and the objective functions are calculated according to (36).












































































Figure 2: Sensitivity of optimal risk exposure ®¤ and the maximal
equity value F(®¤) to the ﬁxed default loss factor ½0. We ﬁx T0 = 1 and
½1 = 0:3 and plot the optimal investment risk exposure ®¤ as a function of the
ﬁxed deadweight loss factor ½0. For each ½0 2 [0;0:2], the optimal risk exposure
is found and the corresponding maximal equity value is calculated according to
(36).























































































: Sensitivity of optimal risk exposure ®¤ and the maximal
equity value F(®¤) to the proportional default loss factor ½1. We ﬁx
T0 = 1 and ½0 = 0:1 and plot the optimal investment risk exposure ®¤ as a
function of the proportional deadweight loss factor ½1. For each ½1 2 [0:1;0:5],
the optimal risk exposure is found and the corresponding maximal equity value
is calculated according to (36).














































































Figure 4: Sensitivity of optimal risk exposure ®¤ and the maximal
equity value F(®¤) to the investment span T0. We ﬁx ½0 = 0:1 and
½1 = 0:1 and plot the optimal investment risk exposure ®¤ as a function of the
span T0. For each T0, the optimal risk exposure is found and the corresponding
maximal equity value is calculated according to (36).










































































Figure 5: Sensitivity of optimal risk exposure ®¤ and the maximal
equity value F(®¤) to the default cost factor M. Without loss of generaliy,
we ﬁx C0 = 1 and plot the optimal investment risk exposure ®¤ as a function
of the bound M. For each M, the optimal risk exposure is found and the
corresponding maximal equity value is calculated according to (37).
31